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Abstract
This paper proposes a model to analyze the dynamic relations between
incentive contracts and analysts’ effort in providing accurate research when
both ethical and reputational concerns matter. First, we show that reputation
picks up ability and thus serves as a sorting device: when analysts have a rel-
atively low reputation for providing research quality (below a threshold level)
banks find it more profitable to offer a mix of monetary and non monetary
(ethic based) incentives and rely on the analyst’s work ethic in ordre to pro-
vide research quality. Alternatively, when analysts have a high reputation, full
financial (performance based) incentives contracts offer a substantial reward
for their contribution to the firm’s profits. Second, we find that the design
of compensation contracts, in the presence of reputational concerns and work
ethic, may lead to incentive problems: full financial incentives contracts may
exacerbate conflicts of interest by giving analysts extrinsic rewards on report-
ing, thereby inducing them to prefer high short term benefits to the detriment
of long term research and coverage effort. On the contrary, a mix of monetary
and non monetary rewards based on the analyst’s work ethic may allow them
to resist pressures from conflicts of interest and induces a high research effort
thus enhancing long-run reputation.
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1 Introduction
We propose a theoretical model to analyze the impact of incentives arising from
compensation contracts on the dynamic reporting behavior of security analysts, in
the presence of reputational and ethical concerns. The recent scandals in Wall Street
research that followed the bursting of the dot-com bubble has led to an examination
of the perverse role of analysts incentives in providing biased research. Therefore,
the issue of how the nature of incentives affects analysts’ research and coverage effort
is important and relevant.
In this paper, we focus on the trade-off between short run revenues and long run
research quality (and hence reputation) in a context where incentives may be finan-
cial (based on performance) and non financial (based on a standard for accuracy).
A large number of studies have documented conflicts of interest for analysts and
their impact on the quality of securities research.1 For instance, analysts may seek
to win lucrative underwriting business by issuing optimistic research about current
or potential clients. In turn, providing biased research undermines analysts reputa-
tion with investors. From this perspective, analysts might sacrifice their reputation
for providing valuable information to investors when confronted with sufficiently
valuable short-term payoff.2
The design of compensation contract offered to analysts then requires a specific
attention to analyze the sources of conflict of interest in analyst research. In partic-
ular, both long term reputational concerns as well as short term incentives matter.
A growing literature in agency theory points out that there may be hidden costs
of pure monetary incentives, especially when individuals are intrinsically motivated
to do a good job (see e.g. Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Lindeberg, 2001; Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Frey et al., 1997; Kreps, 1997). We borrow from this literature the idea
that incentives may be designed over monetary as well as non monetary dimensions,
in particular by taking work ethic into consideration (see e.g. Noe and Rebello,
1994; Carlin and Gervais, 2009). In general, ethic and intrinsic motivation to exert
an effort is private information and can not be contracted upon. As such, the firm
must design compensation contracts allowing the screening of agents and motivating
1See Mehran and Stultz (2007) for a review of conflicts of interest in general. Dugar and Nathan
(1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), Dechow et al. (2000), Michaely and Womack (1999), and Chan
et al. (2007) document conflicts of interest arising from investment-banking activity. Irvine (2001,
2004), Cowen et al. (2006), Hong and Kubik (2003) and Agrawal and Chen (2008) discuss conflicts
of interest created by the incentives to generate trade commissions. The remaining agency conflict
is caused by the desire of analysts to stay on friendly terms with management (see Lim (2001),
Das et al. (1998), and Francis and Philbrick (1993).
2See Jakson (2005) for theoretical discussion of analysts’ trade-offs and reputation, Fang and
Yasuda (2009a) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) for empirical analysis.
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them in accordance with their ethical preferences. Following Heinle and Hoffman
(2007), we therefore consider that analysts may experience ethical distress whenever
their action choices deviate from a standard or norm as specified in the employment
contract. The analyst’s activity is a complex set of tasks: data collection, company
visits, writing forecasts that will contribute to the firm’s attractiveness, etc. To
account for these elements, we decompose the analyst’s activity into two sequential
efforts: first, a research and coverage effort, and second, a reporting effort.3 In
addition, we consider that the analyst’s effort to achieve high quality reporting will
be tied to non monetary (ethical distress) or monetary incentives. The incentive
structure on the report’s quality can be interpreted as follows. If, the analyst is
likely to invest in research quality, then financial incentives over accuracy are use-
less. Otherwise, the employer may offer performance-based incentives for the overall
reporting effort (i.e. the production of forecasts and their accuracy). In that case,
the analyst’s compensation is tied to both the generation of forecasts and recom-
mendations, and the quality of the research provided to the investors. Therefore, we
build on the premise that a conflict of interest arises due to substantial monetary
awards on reporting; if there is a large amount of money at stake -due to incentives-,
which manifests itself as business-generated revenues, the temptation to forgo the
research quality is high. Finally, the trade-off faced by firms in designing compensa-
tion contracts that incorporate monetary and non monetary (ethic based) incentives
over the report’s quality is analyzed in a dynamic setting with long term reputation
building concerns.
Our focus on how incentive contracts affect the analyst’s reporting effort by taking
reputation and work ethic into account generates several predictions. First, we show
that reputation picks up ability and thus serves as a sorting device: when analysts
have a relatively low reputation for providing research quality (below a threshold
level), banks find it more profitable to offer a mix of monetary and non monetary
(ethic based) incentives, and to rely on the analyst’s work ethic to provide research
quality. Alternatively, when analysts have a high reputation for providing research
quality, then banks will offer full financial incentives contracts. These results are
consistent with empirical evidence on the relation between pay and performance
(see e.g. Stickel, 1992, and Michaely and Womack, 1999). We contribute to this
literature by showing that analysts use their forecasts as a tool to develop their rep-
utation as long as the compensation contract values the reputation sufficiently. As
3The research and coverage effort relates to the information gathering process (including earn-
ings and other information from SEC filings, industry and macroeconomic conditions and confer-
ence calls and other management communications). The reporting effort relates to the outputs
from analyst research (including earnings forecasts, target price forecasts, stock recommendations
and reports describing firms’ prospects).
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mentioned, banks offer the performance based contract to attract talented analysts
and reward their contribution to the firm’s profits (i.e. analysts with an established
reputation are better incentivized than other analysts). Alternatively, if analysts are
less accurate, then their compensation is lower. The incentives of analysts therefore
capture skills.
Second, we find that the design of compensation contracts, in the presence of rep-
utational concerns and work ethic, may lead to incentive problems. In particular,
full financial incentives contracts appear to exacerbate conflicts of interest by giv-
ing analysts extrinsic rewards on research quality, thereby inducing a lower research
and coverage effort. Further financial incentives induce analysts to prefer high short
term benefits to the detriment of long term reputation. On the contrary, a mix
of monetary and non monetary rewards based on the analyst’s work ethic induces
a high research effort thereby enhancing a long-run reputation. Overall, while full
financial incentives contracts tend to be harmful for both long-run reputation and
research quality, mixed incentives contracts may play a mitigating role in analyst
conflicts translating into a high research-reputation equilibrium. By focusing on
compensation structures that provide adequate incentives to analysts in order to
avoid exploiting conflicts of interest we contribute to the literature on career con-
cerns and incentives (see e.g. Hong and Kubik, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Ljungqvist
et al., 2007, Fang and Yasuda, 2009b). In particular, we endogenously derive the
incentive structure of the analyst by modeling the interaction between the invest-
ment bank and the analyst, when both reputational and ethical concerns matter.
We show that implicit incentives arising from the presence of ethical concerns play
a crucial role in inducing analysts to resist pressure from conflicts of interest. Our
theory indicates that without ethical considerations at stake, the attraction of lu-
crative compensation and then the temptation to liquidate reputation for profits are
stronger for reputable analysts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 presents the equilibrium behaviors of agents. Section 4 analyzes the sta-
tionary equilibrium and discusses the main results of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 General Set-Up
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who live for two
periods. The size of the population is constant. We index by t + 1 the generation
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born in t. Each generation consists of two classes of agents: employers (investment
bankers, brokers or any institution employing financial analysts) and financial ana-
lysts. There is a continuum of mass 1 of financial analysts and a continuum of mass
1 of employers. Analysts are randomly matched one-to-one with employers for the
duration of their lifetime.4 We model the relationship between the employer and
the analyst as a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard due to imperfect
observability of the analyst’s effort.5
For simplicity (and without loss of generality), we assume that analysts do not
consume in the first period, receive a wage only in the second period and do not
save or leave bequests (they consume their entire earnings).
The analyst activity is a complex set of tasks that include research and coverage
(data collection, calls, company visits, meetings, and contact with the company’s
managers etc.), reporting (writing forecasts and recommendations) and contributing
to the firm’s attractiveness both with existing and potential clients. In this paper,
we consider two sequential activities. In the first period, the analyst provides a
research and coverage effort, and in the second period he exerts a reporting effort.6
Incentives in the second period are designed over two dimensions: producing a report
and meeting a standard for quality or accuracy. Producing the report is subject to
usual financial incentives, but meeting the standard for quality or accuracy is subject
either to non-financial, (intrinsic) incentives, or to explicit financial (performance-
based, extrinsic) incentives. The analyst’s task in the second period hence consists
of a principal task -the reporting effort- and a secondary task -meeting a quality
standard. The "secondary" dimension of the reporting effort can be interpreted
as follows. The employer may offer performance-based incentives for the overall
reporting effort (i.e. the production of the report and its quality). Yet, if the
employer believes that the analyst will invest in research quality and provide reports
likely to meet the accuracy standards, then financial incentives over quality are
useless. The distinction between principal and secondary activities stems from the
differences in the nature of incentives and is tied to the design of compensation
contracts. This is formalized as follows.
The contractual relationship between the employer and the analyst is sub-
ject to imperfect observability of the analyst’s effort. Hence, the employer has to
4This corresponds to high mobility costs. Relaxing this assumption and letting analysts change
for a different employer would not alter the basic results of our paper.
5For the rest of this paper we will use “she” to refer to the principal (the bank) and “he” to refer
to the agent (the analyst).
6Such a sequentiality is observed in practice.
4
design a contract that helps solving the moral hazard problem. In practice, there
is a large set of rewarding tools and the analysts’ compensation package is quite
complex.7 According to the 2003 analyst settlement, banks must tie an analyst’s
compensation to his reporting activity rather than to the amount of investment-
banking revenues generated. These two components of an analyst’s compensation
may create conflicting incentives. At the individual level, banks face a trade-off
between short-term profit arising from increased trading volume and long-term rep-
utation. Analysts also face a trade-off between a loss in long-term reputation and a
gain in short-term benefits, such as underwriting-related revenues. The relation be-
tween reputation and research quality implies that banks and other firms employing
financial analysts may propose different compensation contracts.8 In this paper, we
focus on two sets of compensation tools: purely monetary incentives (performance-
based compensation) and non-monetary incentives (based on an accuracy standard
for analysts’ reports).
Precisely, all contracts offer financial incentives for the (second period) reporting
effort.9 Yet, one class of contracts offers further financial incentives on the report
quality or accuracy while another class of contracts relies on non financial incentives
to provide research accuracy. In the first type of compensation contract, the mone-
tary wage is conditional upon performance over both reporting and report accuracy.
In the second type of contract, the monetary wage is conditional upon performance
over the reporting task only and non financial incentives are designed over the qual-
ity or accuracy of the report.10 The basic structure of the model (types of contracts
available and sequence of events) are defined with precision as follows.
7Groysberg, Healy and Maber (2008) report that analysts’ compensation is generally based on
three types of indicators: ’input metrics’ (experience, being homegrown or externally hired, and
the type of firms assigned to analysts for coverage - trading volume for instance), ’process metrics’
(client calls, meetings, interactions and company visits as well as the number of stock initiations
meant to generate new business opportunities), and ’output metrics’ (client feedbacks, investment
banking business generated for the bank, commissions earned for stocks covered, and performance
of analysts’ stock recommendations).
8The analyst’s effort also depends on the analyst’s concerns for productivity (or human capital)
and reputation. We will therefore also consider that the analyst’s research effort in the first period
has an impact both on his reputation and productivity in the second period.
9Note that our results would not be altered if we consider that analysts receive a fixed reservation
wage at the end of the first period.
10Concerning the different rewarding tools documented by Groysberg, Healy and Maber (2008),
we focus here on a limited number of determinants (or ’metrics’): the analyst’s human capital
(’input metrics’), the research and coverage effort (’process metrics’ - imperfectly observable by
the bank), and the analyst’s performance in providing high quality forecasts and recommendations
(’output metrics’ - imperfectly observable).
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Sequence of Events:
Period t
• A new generation of financial analysts and employers is born. Each type of
agent lives for two periods.
• Financial analysts and employers are matched one-to-one randomly.
• The analyst uses his unit time endowment to exert an effort of research and
coverage, θt
Period t+ 1
• The employer offers a contract Ωit+1 to the analyst, i = M,F (see definition
1),
• The analyst accepts or rejects the contract
• The analyst exerts a reporting effort which is imperfectly observable by the
employer.
• At the end of period t + 1 output is observed by both parties and payments
are realized (conditional upon verifiable output).
The timing of events is summarized in Figure 1.
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Definition 1. Incentives Contracts
We denote by Ωit+1, i = M ,F , the contract offered by the employer in the beginning
of period t+ 1. This contract is either a ‘mixed incentives’ contract (M-contract) or
a ‘financial incentives’ contract (F-contract):
1. A ‘mixed incentives’ contract ΩMt+1 = (wMt+1, eMt+1, aMt+1) is such that the analyst
receives a monetary wage wMt+1 (financial performance-based incentives) for
his reporting effort, eMt+1 and has to meet a standard for accuracy aMt+1 (non-
financial, non-performance based incentives). In the M-contract, the agent’s
output is evaluated only with respect to the reporting effort.
2. A ‘full financial incentives’ contract ΩFt+1 = (wFt+1, eFt+1, aFt+1) is such that a
monetary wage wFt+1 compensates the analyst for both the reporting effort, eFt+1
and the report accuracy or quality, aFt+1. In the F-contract, the agent’s output
is evaluated with respect to both the reporting effort and the report accuracy.
The equilibrium values of w, e and a characterizing each type of contracts are
computed in Section 3.
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Figure 1. Timing of the Contractual Relationship between Banks and Analysts 
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Earnings are fully consumed by the analyst 
- The employer offers a contract i to the analyst : Ωi
 t+1,  i=M,F 
- The analyst accepts or rejects the contract 
2.2 Analysts’ Intertemporal Utility and Productivity
In each period, a generation of analysts is born and lives for two periods. The
analyst’s intertemporal utility is defined over leisure time and consumption.11 In
the first period of life, the analyst uses his unit time endowment to exert a research
and coverage effort denoted by θt. The effort cost in the first period is simply a time
cost. In the second period, the analyst’s consumption level is denoted by ct+1. The
analyst receives a wage only in period t+1 and do not consume in the first period.12
The intertemporal utility function of an analyst member of generation t + 1 (born
in t) is then given by:
ut+1 = log(1− θt) + log ct+1 (1)
with 1− θt the first period leisure time and ct+1 the second period consumption.
The analyst’s productivity in t + 1, ρt+1 depends on two arguments: the research
and coverage effort in period t, θt and the previous period productivity level, ρt:
ρt+1 = ρ(θt, ρt) (2)
where ρ(., .) is increasing in both arguments, differentiable and concave.
Budget constraint :
The analyst receives a wage only in period t + 1 and do not consume in the first
period. The budget constraint therefore writes ct+1 ≤ ωt+1 where ωt+1 is the ex-
pected wage (net of effort costs) in period t+ 1. Since entire earnings are consumed
in the second period (there are no savings or bequests), substituting for ct+1 in the
intertemporal utility leads to the following utility function:
ut+1 = log(1− θt) + log(ωt+1) (3)
2.3 Analysts’ Reputation
The role of personal reputation in determining forecasts accuracy and the relation-
ship between pay and performance have been documented by Fang and Yasuda
11This is a basic assumption in overlapping generations models.
12Equivalently we can consider the analyst receives a fixed wage in period t and normalizes it to
his reservation wage.
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(2009). The authors show that analysts working at top-tier banks receive higher
compensation packages and are more accurate than analysts working at lower-status
banks. In this paper, we rely on these elements to model the analyst’s reputation and
analyze how it affects the bank’s choice of compensation contract and the analyst’s
reporting effort.
At the beginning of period t + 1 the bank offers a compensation contract to the
analyst. This means the bank needs some information available regarding the ana-
lysts’ types. Indeed, analysts can be categorized according to information available
on them at that time. Information on an analyst’s type depends on the history of
his observed productivity levels.13 At the beginning of time t + 1, the productiv-
ity level of an analyst includes information about his research and coverage effort
and past productivity for periods previous to t + 1. In the simple model presented
here, we assume therefore and without loss of generality, that if an analyst produced
high quality research in period t, he is placed in the high-productive type in period
t + 1. That is, it is thought more likely that the analyst provides informative re-
search. Let ρt+1 be the publicly observable productivity level of a high-productive
analyst after he has exerted a research effort and before the disclosure of the report.
Alternatively, an analyst who produced lower quality research is placed in the low-
productive type, (1−ρt+1).14 This information allows the bank to update its beliefs
about an analyst’s research quality using Bayes’ rule, wherever possible.
Let us denote by pit+1 the probability, as perceived by banks, that the analyst pro-
vides high quality research given the analyst’s public research quality (or produc-
tivity) history. The reputation of analysts which provide high quality research is
updated according to:
pi(ρt+1) =
ρt+1
ρt+1 + (1− ρt+1)η (4)
The numerator is the proportion of high-productivity analysts who provide high
quality research, and the denominator is the total proportion of analysts who issue
informative research. Equation (4) follows from the fact that high-productivity
analysts always provide informative reports, while low-productivity analysts provide
informative reports with probability η in any given period.
13 The academic literature that analyzes the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts as a function
of experience and past accuracy includes Stickel (1992), Clement (1999) and Jackson (2005).
14For a formal presentation of this result see Aron (1987).
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2.4 Output and Incentives in the Second Period
At the beginning of the second period the firm offers a compensation contract to
the analyst who may accept or reject it. Two types of contracts are available: an
incentive mix contract (on reporting) or a pure financial incentive contract (on both
the reporting effort and the report quality). The objective of the firm is to design
the contract in a way acceptable by the analyst (i.e. participation is ensured) and
inducing the analyst to exert the maximal effort level (i.e. it is incentive compatible).
The analyst’s effort in the second period consists of a principal task - reporting - and
a requirement over the quality or accuracy of the report. The incentives structure
of the model corresponds to a variant of the linear multi-tasks agency framework
first developed by Holmström and Milgrom (1987, 1991).15
Incentives Structure of both Types of Contracts
With a linear multi-tasks incentives scheme, the optimal contract is designed as
follows: the principal determines the linear compensation (a fixed transfer plus a
variable component expressed with respect to the analyst’s observable output) that
maximizes his/her expected profits, given that effort(s) is(are) chosen by the analyst
so as to maximize his/her expected utility.
Let denote by yit+1 the analyst’s observable output in the contract i, i = M,F . This
output depends on the reporting effort eit+1 and, as described in definition 1:
· In the F-contract, output is also measured with respect to the accuracy of the
report aFt+1
· In the M-contract, output depends only on the reporting effort eMt+1, and not
on the standard for accuracy aMt+1.
Since effort is imperfectly observable, outputs under each contract are defined by:
yMt+1 = e
M
t+1 + ε
M
t+1 (5)
yFt+1 = e
F
t+1 + a
F
t+1 + ε
F
t+1 (6)
15This model has been extensively used to analyze multi-tasks agency relationships almost exclu-
sively under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion: in this linear-exponential-normal
(LEN) model agents have a negative exponential utility, see e.g. Itoh, 1994 or Feltham and Xie,
1994). Given the intertemporal utility function (3), our approach extends this class of models with
linear compensation schemes to agents with decreasing absolute risk aversion (constant relative
risk aversion).
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where εMt+1 and εFt+1 are random noises capturing imperfect observability of effort
such that εMt+1  N(0, (σM)2) and εFt+1  N(0, (σF )2) .
Let denote by Cit+1 the analyst’s cost of efforts under a contract i = M,F . The
analyst’s expected wage net of effort costs, ωit+1, and the risk-neutral firm’s expected
profits, Bit+1, write respectively:
ωit+1 = E(w
i
t+1)− Cit+1 ∀i = M,F (7)
Bit+1 = pi(ρt+1).E(y
i
t+1)− E(wit+1) ∀i = M,F (8)
with pi(ρt+1) the analyst’s reputation, E(yit+1) the analyst’s expected output and
where the expected wage E(wit+1) received by the analyst is defined as follows.
Under a linear incentive scheme, the wage received by the analyst at the end of
period t+ 1 is linear in the expected observable performance measure:
E(wit+1) = α
i
t+1.E(y
i
t+1) + β
i
t+1 ∀i = M,F (9)
where αit+1 and βit+1 are respectively the variable part (‘piece rate’) and the fixed
part of the compensation to be determined by the firm in such a way that the
maximum effort levels are chosen by the analyst in equilibrium.
We now define effort costs under both types of contracts. All variables in the second
period are indexed by t+ 1. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we now therefore omit
the time period indexes t + 1 when they are not necessary. We do this throughout
the text when no confusion arises, and we reintroduce the time period indexes later
on.
Mixed Incentives Contract (M-contract)
Under the M-contract, the firm sets a standard for the report’s accuracy and com-
pensates financially the analyst only for his (unobservable) reporting effort. The
analyst’s overall observable output is defined by equation (5) : yM = eM + εM , with
εM  N(0, (σM)2), and the wage compensation defined in equation (9) is linear:
E(wM) = αM .E(yM) + βM = αM .eM + βM .
The effort costs depend on the reporting effort as well as on the standard for ac-
curacy. The standard set by the principal establishes the quality or accuracy re-
quirement over the reporting effort. Though no monetary sanctions or rewards are
attached to meeting the standard, any deviation from it by the analyst imposes a
12
personal cost. This formulation allows us to capture the analyst’s implicit incentives
to meet the standard. The effort cost function hence writes
CM(eM , aM) =
1
2
(eM)2 +
λ
2
(eM − aM)2 (10)
where 0 < λ < 1 measures the importance of meeting the standard required by the
bank. Intuitively, the higher λ, the higher the cost of not meeting the standard for
the analyst. Hence, λ measures the pressure felt by the analyst when having to
meet the standard and can be interpreted as an "ethical distress" (corresponding to
a norm adhesion motive or work ethic).16
Full Financial Incentives Contract (F-contract)
Under the F-contract, the firm compensates the analyst for his reporting effort as
well as for the report accuracy. The analyst’s overall observable output is defined by
equation (6): yF = eF +aF +εF , with εF  N(0, (σF )2), and the wage compensation
defined in equation (9) is linear: E(wF ) = αF .E(yF ) + βF = αF .(eF + aF ) + βF .
The effort costs depend on the reporting effort as well as on the effort to increase
the report accuracy or quality. Both tasks are interdependent in the cost function
and the effort cost then writes
CF (eF , aF ) =
1
2
(eF )2 +
1
2
(aF )2 + µ.eF .aF (11)
where −1 < µ < 1 measures the degree of complementarity between the two types
of efforts (reporting and achieving high accuracy). Since ∂
2CF (.,.)
∂eF ∂aF
= ∂
2CF (.,.)
∂aF ∂eF
= µ, the
higher µ, the higher the marginal cost of increasing effort at both tasks. A higher
level of µ hence corresponds to a higher (that is more costly) conflict of interest
between both tasks for the analyst. When −1 < µ < 0, the two efforts (reporting
and achieving high accuracy) are relative complements: an increase in one effort,
all else being equal, reduces the marginal cost of the other effort. This situation
arises when quantity and quality are relative complement, for instance because the
analyst has a very good knowledge of the businesses evaluated. On the contrary,
when 0 < µ < 1, the two efforts are relatively substitutable: an increase in one effort,
all else being equal, increases the marginal cost of the other effort. This situation
may arise when quantity and quality are substitutable, for instance because the
analyst has to evaluate many businesses and this is detrimental to the accuracy of
the report on a stock.
16We borrow from Heinle and Hoffmann (2007) such a disutility for not meeting a standard.
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The contractual relationship between the firm and the analyst under both types of
contracts is summarized in Appendix 6.1.
We now characterize the equilibrium variables of each contract.
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of this economy is solved backward: first, we determine the optimal
second period contract and then present the optimal research effort in the first
period.
3.1 Second Period Equilibrium
For each incentive contract, the equilibrium values of effort and wages are determined
as follows: the firm determines the equilibrium wage compensation (fixed transfer
and piece rate) that maximizes its expected profits, anticipating that the effort
chosen by the analyst will maximize his/her expected utility. The corresponding
equilibrium values are defined as follows (for detailed computations see appendix
6.2).
• Mixed incentives contract, ΩMt+1 = (wMt+1, eMt+1, aMt+1):
eMt+1 = pi(ρt+1)−ΨMt+1 (12)
aMt+1 = pi(ρt+1) (13)
E(wMt+1) =
(pi(ρt+1))
2
2
− (Ψ
M
t+1)
2(1 + λ)
2
(14)
BMt+1 =
(pi(ρt+1))
2
2
− pi(ρt+1).ΨMt+1 +
(ΨMt+1)
2(1 + λ)
2
(15)
where ΨMt+1 =
σMt+1√
2
.
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• Financial incentives contract, ΩFt+1 = (wFt+1, eFt+1, aFt+1):
eFt+1 = a
F
t+1 =
pi(ρt+1)
1 + µ
− Ψ
F
t+1
2
(16)
E(wFt+1) =
(pi(ρt+1))
2
1 + µ
− (Ψ
F
t+1)
2(1 + µ)
4
(17)
BFt+1 =
(pi(ρt+1))
2
1 + µ
− pi(ρt+1).ΨFt+1 +
(ΨFt+1)
2(1 + µ)
4
(18)
where ΨFt+1 =
σFt+1√
2
.
To analyze which type of contract will be offered, we compare the firm’s expected
profits. To simplify the analysis, we make the two following assumptions.
Assumption 1: Identical Variance Parameters
σFt = σ
M
t = σt ∀t (19)
This assumption illustrates that additional effort to achieve a high report accuracy
does not change the variance of the analyst’s output, and therefore does not improve
the performance measure of the reporting effort. This restriction allows a comparison
of both types of contracts by considering that the variability of output remains the
same, while the analyst’s expected output and costs are different.
Assumption 2: The parameters are such that
σt
2
√
1 + µ
2
1− µ+ 2λ
1− µ < 1 ∀t (20)
This assumption ensures that 0 < ρ¯t+1 < 1 (see proposition 1 below).
Comparing the firm’s expected profits under the M- and F- contracts leads to the
following result:
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1 and 2, the equilibrium contract that maxi-
mizes the firm’s expected profits Bit+1(i = M,F ) is the mixed incentives contract (M-
contract) ΩMt+1 = (wMt+1, eMt+1, aMt+1) iff the analyst’s productivity is below the threshold
level ρ¯t+1: ρt+1 < ρ¯t+1 = Ξ.Ψt+1.ηt+11+Ξ.Ψt+1.(ηt+1−1) where Ξ =
√
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ and Ψt+1 =
σt+1√
2
;
and the financial incentives contract (F-contract) ΩFt+1 = (wFt+1, eFt+1, aFt+1) otherwise.
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with Ψt+1 = σt+1√2 and where w
i
t+1, e
i
t+1, B
i
t+1, a
i
t+1, i = F,M are defined by equations
(12) to (18).
Proof : Using (15) and (18) we have:
BMt+1 −BFt+1 =
(pi(ρt+1))
2
2
µ− 1
µ+ 1
+
Ψ2t+1
4
(1− µ+ 2λ)
Given that −1 < µ < 1, we then easily show that BMt+1 − BFt+1 > 0 iff (pi(ρt+1))2 <
Ψ2t+1
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ , that is: pi(ρt+1) < p¯it+1 = Ψt+1
√
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ
Given equation (4), this condition writes: ρt+1 < ρ¯t+1 = Ξ.Ψt+1.ηt+11+Ξ.Ψt+1.(ηt+1−1) where
Ξ =
√
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ and Ψt+1 =
σt+1√
2
.

Under the mixed incentives contract (M-contract), financial incentives are given
on the reporting effort exclusively while the F-contract gives financial incentives
on both reporting and accuracy. As such, proposition 1 states that when analysts
have a relatively low reputation for providing research quality (below the threshold
p¯it+1) banks find it more profitable to offer a mixed incentives contract and rely
on the analyst’s intrinsic motivation (work ethic) to meet the accuracy standards.
Alternatively, when analysts have a reputation for providing high quality research,
the F-contract offers a substantial reward for their contribution to the firm’s profits.
Proposition 1 suggests that analysts’ productivity and status influences the design
of incentive contracts. Specifically, we find that reputation picks up analysts’ abil-
ity and is associated with higher compensation. This finding is consistent with
empirical evidence on the relation between pay and performance for financial an-
alysts (see e.g. Eccles and Crane, 1988, Stickel, 1992). In this paper, incentives
to provide reports and forecasts accuracy depend further on analysts’ reputational
concerns and productivity. Fang and Yasuda (2009a) for example, find that banks
pay higher wages to attract talented analysts, and analysts with higher abilities
are more likely to be hired by reputable banks and are better incentivized. In our
model, the financial incentives contract enables the investment bank to bring an an-
alyst a substantially high compensation. By doing so, it acknowledges an analyst’s
prestige. Consistent with evidence showing that star analysts earn substantially
higher salaries than lower-status analysts, our analysts with an established reputa-
tion for producing high-quality research are better incentivized, i.e. are offered the
F-contract. This result is consistent with the notion that reputation is an indicator
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of ability or skill. In other words, reputation has a sorting effect in that analysts
with superior ability or access to information has a high reputation for providing
high quality research. Yet, the lucrative compensation tied to analysts’ performance
creates conflicting incentives, and the literature has examined the effectiveness of the
reputation as a disciplinary device against conflicts of interest (see e.g. Ljungqvist
et al., 2007, and Fang and Yasuda, 2009b). Jackson (2005) for example, shows that
when analysts interact repeatedly with investors and trade off short-term incentives
against the long-term gains from building a good reputation, more accurate analysts
acquire higher future reputation.17 These results echo our finding from proposition
1, namely that, because non-reputable analysts need to build a reputation for pro-
ducing research quality, banks can rely on their intrinsic motivation to meet the
required standard in terms of accuracy, and hence will offer a M-contract.
Given the second period’s contractual variables determined previously, we compute
the first period equilibrium research effort.
3.2 First Period Equilibrium
Given (3) and (2), the analyst’s research effort is determined according to the fol-
lowing program:
max
θt
ln(1− θt) + ln(ωit+1)
s.t. ρt+1 = ρ (θt, ρt)
where ωit+1, i = M,F are given by equations (14) and (17).
This program leads to the following condition:
1
1− θt =
∂(lnωit+1)
∂ρt+1
· ∂ρt+1
∂θt
(21)
where
∂(lnωit+1)
∂ρt+1
=
∂ωit+1/∂ρt+1
ωit+1
for i = M,F
17The relation between analyst reputation and earnings forecasts has been extensively studied
(see, for example, Stickel (1992), Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006), Hong and Kubik (2003)).
These papers find a positive relation between the research quality and analyst reputation.
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To obtain analytical results, we shall consider a specific functional form concerning
the analyst’s productivity in t + 1, defined by equation (2). We therefore assume
that
ρt+1 = At.(θt)
γ.(ρt)
1−γ (22)
where 0 < At ≤ 1 is an efficiency parameter and 0 < γ < 1.
In turn, ∂ρt+1/∂θt = γρt+1/θt. Condition (21) then writes: 11−θt =
∂ωit+1/∂ρt+1
ωit+1
· γρt+1
θt
,
that is:
θt
1− θt = γρt+1
(ωit+1)
′
ωit+1
i = M,F (23)
where (ωit+1)′ = ∂ωit+1/∂ρt+1.
Using (7), (14) and (17), we can write:18
ωit+1 = Ψt+1pi(ρt+1)−∆i(Ψt+1)2
∂ωit+1/∂ρt+1 = Ψt+1pi
′
(ρt+1)
where ∆M = 1 + λ , ∆F = 1+µ
2
, Ψt+1 = σt+1√2 .
In turn, equation (23) becomes:
θt =
γρt+1pi
′
(ρt+1)
γρt+1pi′(ρt+1) + pi(ρt+1)−∆iΨt+1 i = M,F
where pi′(ρt+1) = ηt+1[ρt+1+(1−ρt+1)ηt+1]2 , ∆
M = 1 + λ , ∆F = 1+µ
2
and Ψt+1 = σt+1√2 .
The economy’s intertemporal equilibrium then is defined as follows.
18Indeed we have (we omit all indexes to simplify notations): ω = E(w)−C where E(w) = α.e+β.
In equilibrium β = C + α.(Ψ − e), thus E(w) = α.e + C + α.(Ψ − e). In turn: ω = E(w) − C =
α.e + α.(Ψ − e) = α.Ψ, that is: ωM = αM .Ψ and ωF = αF .Ψ. Substituting for αF and αM then
leads to ωM = Ψ.pi(ρ)− (1 + λ).Ψ2 and ωF = Ψ.pi(ρ)− (1 + µ).Ψ2/2.
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Definition 2. Intertemporal Equilibrium.
An equilibrium is a set of first and second period variables that satisfies equations
(1) to (23), such that under assumption 1 and 2:
1. In the first period, the analyst chooses a level of research investment that max-
imizes his utility : max
θt
ln(1 − θt) + ln(ωit+1) subject to the human capital ac-
cumulation equation
ρt+1 = At · (θt)γ · (ρt)1−γ (24)
which yields:
θt
1− θt = γρt+1
(ωit+1)
′
ωit+1
i = M,F (25)
2. In the second period, the firm offers a M-contract ΩMt+1 = (wMt+1, eMt+1, aMt+1) iff
ρt+1 < ρ¯t+1 and a F-contract ΩFt+1 = (wFt+1, eFt+1, aFt+1) otherwise
with ρ¯t+1 = Ξ.Ψt+1.ηt+11+Ξ.Ψt+1.(ηt+1−1) , Ξ =
√
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ , Ψt+1 =
σt+1√
2
; and where the
variables of Ωit+1 , i = M,F , are defined by equations (12) to (18).
3. The first period research levels given the contract offer i are such that:
θit =
γρit+1pi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
i = M,F (26)
and, given (22), the dynamics of human capital is governed by the following
equation:
ρit+1 = At.
[
γρit+1pi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
]γ
.(ρt)
1−γ i = M,F (27)
where pi′(ρt+1) = ηt+1[ρt+1+(1−ρt+1)ηt+1]2 , ∆
M = 1 +λ , ∆F = 1+µ
2
and Ψt+1 = σt+1√2 .
The dynamics of human capital accumulation is such that ρt+1 is monotonic
and strictly increasing in ρt (see the proof in appendix 6.2)
19
4 Stationary Equilibrium
4.1 Existence of Equilibrium
We now analyze the model’s solutions under a stationary environment. In particular,
we assume that At, σt and pit are constant and equal to A, σ and pi. The threshold
productivity level therefore is constant and equal to ρ¯ = Ξ.Ψ.η
1+Ξ.Ψ.(η−1) , with Ξ =√
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ and Ψ = σ/
√
2.
This stationary threshold value defines two possible steady-state regimes: a
regime with mixed incentives below this value, and a regime with full financial
incentives above.
Let θM (respectively θF ) and ρM ≤ ρ¯ (respectively ρF > ρ¯) denote the steady-
state values of the research coverage efforts and reputation in the M-contract regime
(respectively in the F-contract regime). We shall study the existence and uniqueness
of these equilibrium values.
Note that given equations (24), (26) and ( 27), we have:
ρi = A1/γ
γρipi
′
(ρi)
γρipi′(ρi) + pi(ρi)−∆iΨ (28)
θi = A−1/γρi (29)
We normalize parameter A to 1, and obtain the following stationary values of the
research coverage and productivity19:
ρi is the solution of the following equation:
(
ρi
)2
(1− η) [1−∆iΨ(1− η)]+ ρiη(1 + γ − 2∆iΨ(1− η))− η(γ + ∆iΨη) = 0 (30)
Only one of the two possible solutions is positive, that is:
ρi =
2η(1− η)∆iΨ− η(1 + γ) +
√
Di
2(1− η)(1− (1− η)∆iΨ) (31)
θi = ρi (32)
19This normalization does not change our qualitative results, but we need it to obtain simple
analytical results.
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with Di = (2η(1−η)∆iΨ−η(1+γ))2 +4(1−η)(1−∆iΨ(1−η))(γη+∆iΨη2) > 0
The stationary values of the variables under the M-contract and F-contract then
write:
eM = pi(ρM)−Ψ aM = pi(ρM) (33)
eF = aF =
pi(ρF )
1 + µ
− Ψ
2
(34)
ωi = Ψpi(ρi)−∆iΨ2 i = M,F (35)
BM = (pi(ρM))2 − pi(ρM)Ψ + ∆
M
2
Ψ2 (36)
BF =
(pi(ρF ))2
1 + µ
− pi(ρF )Ψ + ∆
F
2
Ψ2 (37)
pi(ρi) =
ρi
ρi + (1− ρi)η i = M,F (38)
ρi =
2η(1− η)∆iΨ− η(1 + γ) +
√
Di
2(1− η)(1− (1− η)∆iΨ) i = M,F (39)
where ∆M = 1 + λ ∆F = 1+µ
2
,
Di = (2η(1− η)∆iΨ− η(1 + γ))2 + 4(1− η)(1−∆iΨ(1− η))(γη + ∆iΨη2) > 0
and Ψ = σ√
2
.
Given that a M-contract is offered only if the analyst’s productivity is below the
threshold level ρ¯, then the stationary values of productivity under both contracts
only make sense if either ρM ≤ ρ¯ (M-contract) or if ρ¯ < ρF (F-contract). These
conditions impose the following restriction on the environment:
Condition 1. Under assumption 1 and 2, there exists a unique equilibrium contract
if and only if either
ρM =
2η(1− η)∆MΨ− η(1 + γ) +
√
DM
2(1− η)(1− (1− η)∆MΨ) ≤ ρ¯ =
Ξ.Ψ.η
1 + Ξ.Ψ.(η − 1) (40)
in which case the optimal contract is based on mixed incentives (M-contract), or
if
ρ¯ =
Ξ.Ψ.η
1 + Ξ.Ψ.(η − 1) < ρ
F =
2η(1− η)∆FΨ− η(1 + γ) +
√
DF
2(1− η)(1− (1− η)∆FΨ) (41)
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in which case the optimal contract is based on full financial incentives (F-contract),
where Ξ =
√
1+µ
2
1−µ+2λ
1−µ , ∆
M = 1+λ, ∆F = 1+µ
2
, Ψ = σ√
2
, Di = (2η(1−η)∆iΨ−
η(1 + γ))2 + 4(1− η)(1−∆iΨ(1− η))(γη + ∆iΨη2) > 0 i=M,F.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 2 Under condition 1, the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium.
The mixed financial incentives contract is offered by firms with analyst’s productiv-
ity (and thus reputation) below the threshold level ρ¯. Otherwise, the full financial
incentives contract is offered.
Proof: Immediate from condition 1. 
4.2 Comparison of Research Levels and Wages
Given the various parameters characterizing our endogenous variables, only numer-
ical simulations allow comparing research levels and wages in each regime.
As reported in figure 2, we see that the full financial incentives contract is char-
acterized by lower quality research services in the first period and a high expected
wage in the second period (Figure 2, case a). On the contrary, the mixed financial
incentives contract is characterized by a high quality research coverage in the first
period and a low expected wage (tied to analysts’ reporting effort) in the second
period (Figure 2, case b).
Our simulations show that by offering a contract that imposes ethical distress on
analysts (the M-contract), a bank ensures that analysts exert a high research effort
in the first period. Under the M-contract, the lower responsiveness of effort to incen-
tives in the second period is compensated for by a higher research and coverage effort
in the first period compared to the hypothetical but out-of equilibrium research level
that would have been driven by monetary incentives over both reporting and report
accuracy. In turn, high research and coverage effort in the first period translates
into a high reputation for the analyst. Overall, with a mixed incentives contract,
a bank relies on ’work ethic’ regarding reports accuracy and on reputational con-
cerns regarding research and coverage efforts. This is the high research-reputation
equilibrium associated with a M-contract.
Alternatively, under the F-contract, the higher responsiveness of effort to incentives
(and the higher expected wage) in the second period induces a lower research effort
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in the first period compared to the hypothetical but out-of equilibrium research level
that would have been driven by non monetary incentives over accuracy. In turn,
low quality research services in the first period undermine the analyst reputation for
providing valuable reports and recommendations. This finding indicates that under
full financial incentives contracts analysts face pressure from conflicts of interest.
More precisely, the desire to win short term gains -a higher wage in the second period
associated with the F-contract- leads analysts astray from research and coverage
effort, which in turn inherently damages their reputation. This is the low research-
reputation equilibrium associated with a full financial incentives contract.
Our results allow to examine the impact of compensation plans on an analyst’s ef-
fort choice by taking reputational concerns and work ethic into consideration. The
main idea is that the design of compensation contracts, in the presence of repu-
tational concerns and work ethic, may lead to incentive problems and suboptimal
action-choice among analysts. We argue that whenever a compensation contract in-
cludes further financial incentives to produce high-quality research -compared with
a contract that offers a non-monetary compensation-, analysts face a trade-off be-
tween high short-term gains and long-term reputational concerns. Moreover, the
outcome of this conflict of interest is that analysts liquidate their reputation. In
this paper, higher expected short-term gains -or equivalently, a high second period
wage under the F-contract- induce analysts to act opportunistically leading their
research quality to fall which in turn, weakens their reputation. A large literature
has documented the existence of conflicts of interest in analyst research and the dis-
ciplinary role of reputation.20 Theory predicts that an analyst with an established
reputation for providing high quality research is more likely to forgo opportunistic
behavior in order to preserve the benefits attached to a high reputation.21 Yet, our
findings show that if a conflict of interest exists and impacts the research quality
of analysts, it has the greater impact on reputable analysts.22 As suggested in the
above proposition, the attraction of lucrative compensation, and then the tempta-
tion to liquidate reputation for profits are strongest for reputable analysts. This
result is at odds with the theoretical effect of personal reputation. Fang and Yasuda
(2009b) for example find that while bank reputation alone fails at inducing research
20A large number of studies document conflicts of interest in analyst research. Dugar and Nathan
(1995), Michaely and Womack (1999), Dechow et al. (2000), and Chan et al. (2007) document
conflicts of interest arising from investment banking funding. Cowen et al. (2006) and Agrawal
and Chen (2008) discuss conflicting incentives due to trade commissions generation.
21See Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Jackson (2005) for theoretical discussions of analysts’
conflicting incentives and the role of reputation.
22Recall that the F-contract which gives financial incentives on both the reporting effort and
report accuracy is likely to be higher with the analyst’s initial productivity level and hence repu-
tation.
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accuracy, personal reputation is an effective disciplinary device against conflicts of
interest. What exacerbates the conflict of interest in our paper is the substantial
compensation associated with the F-contract. Such contracts appear to destroy an-
alysts incentives to provide high quality research and preserve their reputation. In
contrast, we find that analysts who face ethical concerns about the quality of their
research become more accurate. This finding indicates that under compensation
contracts that consider analysts work ethic -the M-contract- analysts are able to
resist pressures from conflict of interest or that they face fewer pressures.23 Overall,
full financial incentives contracts tend to exacerbate the conflict of interest problem
in analyst research, and thus appear to be harmful for both long-run reputation and
research quality. Instead, mixed incentives contracts that rely on analysts ethic may
play a mitigating role in analyst conflicts translating into a high research-reputation
equilibrium.
23Related ideas about the ethics of agents have been discussed. For example, Friedman (1988)
argues that managers feel a moral obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. Alternatively, Akerlof
(1982) argues that gift exchange is an element in employee-employer relations and norms for the
effort provision are the basis of employment contracts.
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Figure 2. Simulations on Research Levels and Expected Wages 
 
Case (a): The equilibrium contract is based on full-financial incentives (F-contract) 
Parameters value:   σ=0.1   η=0.7  γ=0.3 
 
The following two figures show that condition 1 is met. 
  
 
The following two figures reproduce the research and wage levels. 
  
 
Case (b): The equilibrium contract is based on mixed incentives (M-contract) 
Parameters value:   σ=0.1   η=0.1  γ=0.01 
 
The following two figures show that condition 1 is met. 
  
 
The following two figures reproduce the research and wage levels. 
  
 
 
5 Conclusion
Following the scandals in the U.S. and worldwide public concern regarding the ana-
lyst research, the SEC adopted a settlement in 2003 that required securities firms to
substantially sever the links between research and investment banking, particularly
with respect to the analysts’ compensation. There is a consensus that conflicts of
interest exist in analyst research, and recent empirical studies have investigated the
role of reputation in alleviating conflicting incentives. In this paper, we model a dy-
namic relation between work ethic, reputational concerns and incentives in analyst
research. The starting point of this paper is that while there are potential conflicts
of interest, they will not be exploited unless encouraged by the incentive structure.
More specifically, in our paper, the bank may offer either a mixed incentives contract
(the M-contract) or a full financial incentives contract (the F-contract) depending
on the analyst reputational and ethical concerns. First, we show that when analysts
have a relatively low reputation for providing research quality (below the threshold
p¯it+1) banks will offer a mixed incentives contract, and rely on analysts intrinsic mo-
tivation (work ethic) to meet accuracy standards. Alternatively, when analysts have
an established reputation for providing high quality research, the F-contract enables
the bank to offer a lucrative compensation. In this context, reputation appears to
be an indicator of ability or skill. This finding is consistent with positive sorting as
analysts with superior ability or access to information enjoy a good reputation and
earn high salaries.
Second, by investigating the dynamic relation between compensation contracts and
analysts’ effort in providing research quality, this paper sheds some light on the role
and limits of reputation in mitigating conflicts of interest. We find that full financial
incentives contracts that give extrinsic rewards on the quality of research tend to
exacerbate the conflict of interest. Indeed, the (expected) lucrative compensation
associated with the F-contract induces analysts to reduce their first period research
and coverage effort, which in turn damages their reputation for providing informative
reports. On the contrary, a mix of monetary and non monetary rewards based on
the analyst’s work ethic induces high research effort thereby enhancing long-run
reputation.
The argument presented in this paper invites to consider the relation between ethical
and reputational concerns and incentives as an important driver of the quality of
research. From this perspective, we argue that without ethical considerations at
stake, the attraction of lucrative compensation may induce high-reputation analysts
to liquidate reputation for profits and become less accurate.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Optimal Contracts when σMt = σFt
Table I summarize the contractual relationship between the firm and the analyst
under the M-contract and under the F-contract, when the variance parameters are
identical (assumption 1) and presents the different steps to solve for the optimal
contracts Ωit+1 = (wit+1, eit+1, ait+1),i = M,F .
To simplify notations and when no confusion arises, period t+ 1 indexes have been
omitted.
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 Table I: Characteristics of the Contracts  
(Time indexes are omitted to alleviate notations) 
 Output and Preferences  
 
Observable output 
 
 
 
 
 
Linear compensation 
 
 
Net compensation  
 
 
Agent’s Certainty 
Equivalent 
 
 
 
 
Principal’s  Expected 
Profit 
 
 
 
 
y M =  eM  +  ε M   and  y F =  e F + a F  +  ε F 
where: 
e i is the reporting effort , a i is the standard for accuracy 
ε i is a random (noise) term with distribution Ν(0,(σ i)²) 
i=M,F 
 
E(w i) = α i . Ε( y i ) + β i  ,     i= M,F 
Expected wage (conditional upon expected output) 
 
ω i = E(w i)  - C i  ,     i= M,F 
where C i  is the analyst’s cost of efforts  
 
CE i =  E(w i)  - C i – r(αi)²(σ i)²/2   ,     i= M,F 
where r is the absolute risk aversion coefficient:  
r = - u”(.) / u’(.) = 1 / (w i  - C i ) ,     i= M,F 
given a second period reservation utility null 
 
B i =  pi(ρ) .  Ε( y i )   - E(w i)   ,     i= M,F 
Where  pi(ρ) is the bank reputation level : pi(ρ)= ρ / [ρ+(1−ρ)η] 
and ρ is the analyst’s productivity 
 
 Effort Cost Depending on Incentive Scheme 
 
Mixed incentives 
contract 
 
 
 
Full financial incentives 
contract 
 
 
 
CM(eM,aM) = (eM) ² / 2 + λ. (eM – aM)² / 2   
Where 0<λ<1 measures the importance of meeting the standard  
 
 
CF(eF,aF) = (eF)² / 2 + (aF)² / 2  + µ . eF . aF   
where -1<µ<1 is the degree of complementarity between the two 
types of efforts 
 
Determination of the Optimal Contract 
 
 
Step 1 : Incentive Compatible Constraint :   αi such that   ei = argMax CEi 
Step 2 : Participation Constraint:   βi such that CEi =0 
Step 3 : Optimal Contract:   (ei , ai )= argMax    Bi 
 
  
 
6.2 Dynamics of human capital
Proof that ρt+1 is monotonic and strictly increasing in ρt
The dynamics of human capital is governed by equation (27):
ρit+1 = At.
[
γρit+1pi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
]γ
.(ρt)
1−γ i = M,F
where ∆M = 1 + λ , ∆F = 1+µ
2
, Ψt+1 = σt+1√2 .
In turn, we can write:
ρt+1 = At.(ρt)
1−γ.(ρt+1)γ
[
γpi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
]γ
⇔ ρ1−γt+1 = At.(ρt)1−γ
[
γpi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
]γ
⇔ ρt+1 = A
1
1−γ
t .(ρt)
[
γpi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
] γ
1−γ
⇔ ρt+1 = ρt
[
A
1
γ
t .
γpi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
] γ
1−γ
that is:
ρt+1 = ρt.[G(ρt+1)]
γ
1−γ
with
G(ρt+1) = A
1
γ
t
γpi
′
(ρit+1)
γρit+1pi
′(ρit+1) + pi(ρ
i
t+1)−∆iΨt+1
We show that
G
′
(ρt+1) < 0 ⇔ pi”(.) < 0
Hence, function G(.) is strictly decreasing. Using the implicit function theorem,
ρt+1 therefore is monotonic and strictly increasing in ρt. For each ρt corresponds a
unique ρt+1.

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